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Abstract 
We examine the security and firm characteristics of a sample of 2,027 non-convertible investment grade 
floating rate securities (bonds) issued by the US based firms between 1980 and 2018. These bonds 
pay a coupon based on short term reference rate, such as fed funds rate, plus a fixed quoted margin. 
Considerable number (81.6%) of these issues are between 1992 and 2007 signifying floating rate as an 
effective mechanism to mitigate firm’s interest rate risk when the rates are high and expected to fall. A 
positive and significant abnormal return (CAR = 0.27%), in the event window surrounding issue date, 
provides strong evidence that the floating rate is viewed as a less restrictive provision as compared to 
the call option. Majority of the issues (89.3%) are non-callable since the floating rate mitigates interest 
rate risk for the issuing firm. Lack of put provision in these bonds (in only 7.35% of the sample issues) 
signifies no significant investor concerns of falling bond prices. Regression analysis reveals that firms 
with growth options and with higher leverage experience positive CAR due to the financial flexibility 
these bonds provide. Firms with higher level of information asymmetry benefits less from issuing these 
securities since most of these bonds (90.13%) are issued at par therefore, the price is not likely to carry 
information content that mitigates information asymmetry between the firms and the investors. 
Keywords: Corporate Finance; Financing; Floating Rate Securities; Structured Provisions  
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Floating rate securities (variable rate bonds) are very specialized type of a debt instrument which pays a 
coupon rate based on the short term reference rate such as fed funds rate plus a quoted (fixed) margin 
percentage. The quoted margin is typically set based on competitive margins in the markets, the credit risk 
of the debt security, any option embedded in the bonds, and the liquidity risk of the bonds (Fabozzi, 2016). 
Typically, the coupon rate on the variable rate bonds is designed to reset several times in a year. Usually, 
the reset frequency is every quarter. The rate floats in such a manner that there is a hard floor and the ceiling 
which limits the maximum rate up to which the coupon rate can rise and the minimum level to which it can 
fall. One key objective of the firms issuing investment grade bonds with structured provision is to mitigate 
their interest rate risk especially, when the interest rates are high and are expected to fall. One such provision 
that attempts to achieve this objective is the call option. Presence of call option in bonds gives the firms the 
right to call the investment grade bonds at a specific price and time when the rates are expected to fall and 
call the high yield bonds when the yields are expected to fall due to the ratings improvement (Tewari, Byrd, 
and Ramanlal, 2015). On the other hand, the call provision presents higher reinvestment rate risk for the 
investors due to a call prior to the maturity (Winn and Hess, 1959). The floating rate bonds address the 
interest rate risk for the firms through a reset to the lower coupon due to the falling rates and limit the higher 
coupon due to rising rates through the rate ceiling. The floor on these bonds attempts to mitigate the 
reinvestment rate risk for the investors due to the lower coupon reset when the rates are falling. These bonds 
present low price volatility to the investors due to the low duration. Floating rate provision in these bonds 
likely serves similar purpose for the firms as the call provision in the callable bonds without the restrictions 
and costs of the complex call provision. 
 
In this paper we examine the bond characteristics of 2,027 non-convertible floating rate investment grade 
bonds issued between 1980 and 2018 by the US based firms. We only focus on the investment grade bonds 
since most of the floating rate bonds issued are investment grade bonds, highlighting the fact that the firms 
generally use these bonds to mitigate their interest rate risk. We also find that majority of these bonds (89.3%) 
are non-callable which suggests that the firms use floating rates to manage the risk of falling interest rates in 
place of the call option which, is more restrictive (call premium and call protection period) to the firm. Almost 
all the bonds in the sample are issued at par.  
 
These bonds have a shorter maturity (sample average 5.1 years). Diamond (1991) states that the quality 
firms containing private information about their growth options prefer short maturity debt. In addition, firms 
likely issue short maturity bonds to mitigate the under-investment and asset substitution problems faced by 
the firms (Nash, Netter, and Poulson, 2003). There is a considerable number (81.6%) of these bonds issued 
between 1992 and 2007 suggesting that the firms issue these bonds when the rates are high and expected 
to fall. This observation is in line with Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), who use a valuation framework to show 
inverse relations between the interest rates and the credit spreads. 
 
We also find that a very small number (149/2027 = 7.35%) of these bonds in our sample have a put provision 
associated with them.  Since the put option is included in the bonds to counter the risk of falling bond prices 
for the investors, the falling bond prices or the default risk doesn’t seem to be a significant concern in these 
bonds. 
 
We use cumulative abnormal (CAR) around the bond issue date of these firms to assess the market’s 
reaction on the stock price of the issuing firms. We find a significant CAR of 0.27% in the event window 
surrounding the issue date. In order to study characteristics of the issuing firms, we perform regression 
analysis by regressing firm characteristics variables on CAR. Smaller firms with low level of information 
asymmetry, possessing growth options and carrying high leverage are rewarded by the market with a positive 
stock price reaction. The firms which raise lower amount of principal through these bonds relative to the firm 
size are also rewarded with a positive stock price reaction. 
 
Rest of the paper is structured as follows: Literature review and hypothesis development; Methodology, 
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Call Option in Bonds 
 
Kish and Livingston (1992) show that the call option embedded in bonds can mitigate information asymmetry. 
Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) and Bodie and Taggart (1978) find that the call provision in bonds can 
address asset substitution issues in the firms possessing growth options. Ederington and Stock (2002) find 
that the call option could be a positive signaling mechanism when included by the bond issuing firm. 
According to Tewari et al. (2015), the call premium is included in the investment grade bonds to counter the 
call risk for the investors when the interest rates are expected to fall and is included in the high yield bonds 
to counter the call risk due to a ratings improvement. 
 
The call option on the other hand, increases the reinvestment risk for the investors due to the bonds being 
called away prematurely. Winn and Hess (1959) argue that the presence of the call option increases the 
likelihood of loss of income for the bondholders. Guedes and Opler (1996) argue that the high-quality firms 
with call options in the investment grade bonds expose investors to a higher level of reinvestment risk due to 
a call from maturing growth option or due to declining rates in the high interest rate environment. 
 
Growth Options and Bond Provisions 
 
Firms with growth options highly value financial flexibility in financing their operations (Nash et al.,2003). 
Restrictive covenants (poison puts, call option parameters etc.) in the bonds can adversely impact this 
financial flexibility so desired by the firms with growth options to realize those growth options, and the firms 
facing financial distress, to plan the survival. According to Kahan and Yermack (1998) & Anderson (1999), 
firms prefer less restrictive covenants in the debt issues which provides them with the necessary financial 
flexibility, when in possession of maturing growth options. Thatcher (1985) contends that including less 
restrictive covenants, such as designing a weak call option, can increase financial flexibility for the firms 
facing financial distress. Begley (1994) contends that the restriction costs due to the presence of restrictive 
covenants have to be weighed against shareholder wealth maximization. According to Diamond (1991), 
quality firms with private information on the maturing growth options prefer shorter term debt. 
 
Put Option in Bonds 
 
Put option is attached to the bonds to mitigate the investors’ risk of falling bond prices primarily due to some 
special events. The special events are likely to be firms restructuring (e.g., leveraged buyout) and a rating 
downgrade by the ratings agencies due to the event (Crabbe, 1991). Usually, it is referred to as the poison 
put or a super poison put. The put provision allows the investors to put the bond back to the firm at the par 
value on the specific dates outlined in the bond indenture. In some case the put option is associated with 
higher coupon reset (Fields, Kidwell, and Klein, 1994). 
 
Inclusion of put provision in bonds has agency implications for the firm. According to Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 
(2007), the put provision is likely to reduce the agency cost of debt thereby, reducing the financial cost for 
the firm.  Since the presence of put provision is likely to thwart attempts of takeover of the firm, it could lead 
to the problem of managerial entrenchment (Cook and Easterwood, 1994; Kahan and Klaussner, 1993; Roth 
and McDonald (1999)). Tewari (2018) finds strong evidence of the presence of managerial entrenchment in 
the risky firms with outstanding bonds with put provision. The firms with a higher probability of default are 
likely to face asset substitution problem thereby, worsening the agency problem between bondholders and 
stockholders. Nash et al. (2003) argue that the firms which include poison and super poison puts attempt to 
mitigate these issues. Perumpral, Davidson, and Sen (1999) observe negative market reaction to the 
inclusion of poison put in bonds. Poison put is likely to limit transfer of wealth from bond investors to the firm 
owners. 
 
Floating Rate Provision 
 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) use valuation model to find that the credit spreads in the fixed and floating 
rate notes are negatively correlated with the interest rates (credit spreads are low during high interest rate 
environment and vice-versa). They find that effect on the credit spread due to change in the interest rates is 
more pronounced in the investment grade bonds. Although, majority of the bonds in our sample are issued 
at par (the sample only has investment grade bonds), Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1986) finds that the 
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firms with high default risk sell floating rate bonds at a deep discount. Ramaswamy et al. (1986) also find that 
even if originally issued at par these bonds can deviate in price from par due to an increase in the credit risk. 
Morgan (1986) finds that the steeper the term structure of the interest, the lower the duration of the floating 
rates notes. Bhanot and Guo (2017) finds that the treasury floating rate notes provide positive and significant 
excess return as compared to the benchmark index on which the quoted margin is based. Fleckenstein and 
Longstaff (2020) finds that the floating rate notes issued by the US treasury trade for a premium as compared 
to T-bills & notes due to the near constant price. 
 
Hypothesis: Based on the above discussion, we develop the following hypotheses. 
 
H1: The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the issue date of the floating rate bonds is positive since, 
the floating rate bonds (notes) are less restrictive than the call option (call premium and call protection period) 
in mitigating interest rate risk in the investment grade bonds especially, in the high interest rate environment. 
 
H2: Firms with high growth options will exhibit positive and significant CAR since, the floating rate bonds 




Methodology, Sample Data and Variables 
 
Event Study Methodology and Results 
 
The event study methodology used in this study is the standard approach as in Tewari, Ramanlal, Kumar, 
and De (2019).  
 
The first step involves calculating the daily stock returns from the stock prices obtained from CRSP database. 
Final sample consists of the firms with the floating rate bonds whose prices are available on CRSP around 
the issue date of the bonds. Following equation depicts the daily stock returns. 
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Where, 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = the stock return (daily) of stock i on day t. 
 𝑅𝑚𝑡 = CRSP value-weighted index daily return on day t. 
The second step is associated with calculating the expected return for the stocks of the issuing firms around 
the issue date using firm betas. Following equation depicts the expected return ( ?̂?𝑖𝑡 ) of stock i on day t. 
 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀?̂?𝑡 (2) 
 
Finally, the third step involves calculating the abnormal return and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
the stocks of the issuing firms around the issue date. First the abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) is calculated followed 
by the CAR during the event window to assess the stock price reaction to the event. Following equations 
depict the calculations of abnormal return and the CAR. 
 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
 






We assess the stock price reaction (CAR), around the issue date, of the stock of the issuing firms using a 
window of (-1, +4), 6 day window, as in Tewari (2018). Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) use a 6 day window 
to capture the CAR for the bond issue since, the announcement typically occurs on or after the issue date. A 
narrower window close to the announcement date is not likely to capture the full effect of market’s reaction 
to the issuance. According to Miller (1999), if the announcement precedes the issue date, then observation 
of market price reaction on the issue date is not likely to be significant. According to Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986), the measurement of market’s reaction to the debt issue on the announcement date could be 
problematic since there is no guarantee that the debt contract would be completed. The estimation window 
of [-255, -46] with reference to the issue date is used in calculating expected return, which is the traditional 
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approach in event studies (Scholes and Williams, 1977). Table 1 depicts results of the CAR analysis. Average 
CAR for the whole sample is 0.27% which is significant at the 1% level. The results confirm our first 
hypothesis that the market’s reaction to the issuance of these bonds should be positive and significant. 
 







(+) ive:(-) ive Gen. 
Sign Z 
All issues 2,027 0.27% 2.648*** 1208:819 3.005*** 




Sample consists of non-convertible, investment grade (S&P ratings of BBB- and above) floating rate bonds 
issued between 1980 and the 2018 extracted from SDC platinum database. SDC is used to screen and 
gather information relating to each issue. The initial screening of the data involves downloading all the bond 
issues between 1980 and 2018. Data is further screened for the US based firm. All the issues in the City 
Agencies, Federal Credit Agency, Investment Fund, Mortgage Securities, National Agency, National 
Government, Non-Government Agency, Regional Agency, Regional Government, and REIT industries are 
eliminated. All the issues classified as high yield issues are removed and only the investment grade issues 
are kept. All the convertible issues are eliminated. The data is further screened to keep the floating rate 
issues and remaining issues are omitted. Firms with multiple issues in the same year are screened and only 
the first issue of the year is kept in the sample. This is done to preserve the balance of weight of the firms in 
the empirical analysis and avoid duplication. The issues with any missing data and the issues with maturity 
less than 18 months are also eliminated. Final criterion for the sample is that the issuing firm’s data and the 
stock prices for the sample time period must be available on COMPUSTAT and the CRSP respectively. Final 
sample consists of 2,027 non-convertible floating rate investment grade issues by the US based firms. 
COMPUSTAT is used to gather the information relating to characteristics of the issuing firms. CRSP is used 
to obtain the stock prices for the event study purposes. Table 2 contains the industry breakdown of the issuing 
firms. Firms in the financial sector (commercial banks, credit institutions, and investment banks) are the 
largest issuer of floating rate bonds followed by firms in the manufacturing sector.  
 
Table 2: Industry distribution of the sample 
Industry Number of Issues 
Commercial Bank 545 
Credit Inst. 270 
Electric Service 52 
Gas Distribution 5 
Healthcare 5 
Insurance 35 
Investment Bank 720 
Leisure 12 
Manufacturing 251 
Mortgage Bank 1 
Natural Resource 21 
Oil/Gas Pipeline 5 
Other Finance 27 
Pers/Bus/Rep Svc 11 
Radio/TV/Telecom 11 
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We use the following issue specific and the firm specific variables in the empirical analysis following the 
approach in Tewari et al. (2015) and Tewari (2018). 
 
Issue specific variables: The Treasury variable captures the treasury rates (interest rates) over the same 
maturity as each sample issue. The treasury rates for the specific maturities are obtained from the WRDS 
(Wharton Research Data Service). The Principal variable measures the amount of capital raised by the firm 
through each bond issue. The Maturity variable captures the maturity in number of years for each issue. The 
Ratings variable captures the S&P assigned issue rating to each bond issue on the numerical scale with 16 
being the highest and the 7 being the lowest, for the investment grade bonds. The approach is identical as 
in Tewari et al. (2015). Kidwell, Marr, and Thompson (1984) use Moody’s rating in their study. Cantor, Packer, 
and Cole (1997) use the average of Moody’s and S&P rating in their analysis. We use S&P bond ratings in 
our study as in Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007). 
 
The Call variable is a binary variable (1 or 0) which signifies if the issue is callable. The Othcov variable 
captures presence of other restrictive covenants in the bond issue. According to Billet, King, and Mauer 
(2007), firms include other covenants in the bonds to address agency issues arising out of bond issuance. 
Example of other restrictive covenants are sinking fund provision, limitation on additional debt, limitation on 
additional dividend, subordinate issues, asset collateral, call due to poison pill, and the call by issuing equity. 
The last issue specific variable used in the empirical analysis is the Split variable (binary, 1 or 0) which is the 
proxy for the presence of information asymmetry. As in Tewari et al. (2015), the Split is equal to the value of 
one is there is a split in the rating assigned to an issue by the S&P and Moody’s. 
 
 
Figure 1: Average annual maturity distribution of sample 
 
 
Figure 2: Annual 10 year constant maturity US treasury rates (source: www.federalreserve.gov) 
 
Table 3 depicts the annual breakdown of the data by the number of issues, Maturity, Ratings, and issues 


























10 Year US Treasury Rates
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interest rates with the expectations of falling rates. The average annual maturity of the sample over the entire 
time period is around the average of five years. This observation is consistent with Diamond (1991) that low 
risk firms with growth options prefer shorter maturity debt. Tewari et al. (2015) classify bonds as shorter 
maturity bonds for the issues with maturity less than or equal to 20 years and, as longer maturity bonds for 
the issues with maturity greater than 20 years. Our sample suggests that the Floating rate bonds are typically 
issued with shorter maturity. The maturity distribution (Figure 1) depicts a dichotomous annual distribution. 
We observe that the average annual maturity of the bonds was much higher in the early to mid 1980s while 
the average annual maturity decreases to 5.1 years from 1992 to 2007. This is possibly due to the fact that 
the rates were very high in the early 1980s and declined rapidly followed by steady rates from 1992 to 2007 
and the subsequent drop due to the financial crisis (Figure 2). Firms engineer bond provisions to manage 
their interest rate risk. 
 
The proportion of issues with Call is only (217/2,027 = 10.7%). These observations also confirm our first 
hypothesis that the floating rate provision is a substitute for the call provision when the rates are high and 
are expected to fall. 
 
Table 3: Sample breakdown by year 




Number of Issues with 
Call 
1980 1 15.0 11.5 1 
1981 1 8.0 14.0 0 
1982 5 5.0 13.8 2 
1983 7 8.0 14.1 1 
1984 19 12.0 12.0 14 
1985 23 10.3 11.3 20 
1986 3 9.0 11.0 2 
1987 3 6.0 13.3 2 
1988 9 5.2 12.7 4 
1989 9 5.2 11.0 4 
1990 13 2.9 12.8 4 
1991 10 2.3 11.5 0 
1992 34 3.4 11.9 0 
1993 55 4.5 11.2 5 
1994 118 3.7 11.0 13 
1995 83 3.5 11.1 6 
1996 128 4.4 11.6 11 
1997 149 4.7 11.7 3 
1998 168 4.4 11.6 10 
1999 123 5.3 12.3 6 
2000 195 3.7 11.7 10 
2001 129 6.3 12.4 7 
2002 97 4.4 12.1 5 
2003 100 5.4 11.9 7 
2004 119 5.8 11.5 13 
2005 61 5.6 11.5 6 
2006 55 8.5 11.3 13 
2007 40 7.1 11.2 5 
2008 16 7.1 12.4 3 
2009 3 2.3 11.7 0 
2010 12 2.7 13.4 0 
2011 21 2.6 11.0 1 
2012 10 4.9 9.6 1 
2013 42 5.0 11.9 4 
2014 29 5.6 11.2 1 
2015 25 3.6 12.5 4 
2016 37 6.4 12.1 14 
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2017 48 4.8 10.8 10 
2018 27 6.7 9.7 5 
Total/Average 2,027 5.0 11.7 217 
 
Firm Specific Variable: Total Assets variable captures the size of the firm and is used as a control variable. 
M/B* variable is commonly used as a measure of presence of growth options in the firm. The Leverage 
variable (Total Debt/Total Assets) is used as a measure of the level of debt of the firm. Finally, the FCF 
variable is used as a proxy of managerial entrenchment (Jensen, 1986). The approach used by Lehn and 
Poulson (1989); Bae, Klein and Padmaraj (1994)† is used in calculating the FCF. 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression 
analysis. We gather a few important observations from the table. Treasury has a mean value of 4.52% and 
a wide range of 13.46% maximum value to a minimum of 0.16%. Roughly half the issues have the Split rating 
which is in line with Tewari et al. (2015). Very few issues have Call and Othcov restrictions. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of sample variables 




Ratings Call Othcov Split Total 
Assets 
($mil) 




4.52% 219 5.1 11.7 217 209 894 8,8195 7.8 264.3 6,614 
 Median 5.04% 100 3.0 12.0 0 0 0 65,171 5.2 188.6 5,214 
 Maximum 13.46% 4,000 40.1 16.0 1 1 1 677,447 426.9 2606.3 43,357 
 Minimum 0.16% 1.0 1.5 7.0 0 0 0 39 1.2 6.7 3.6 





The regression equation to test the second hypotheses is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑖 
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽8 log (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 𝑖+ 𝛽9 (𝑀/𝐵)𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +𝛽11 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                              (5) 
 
Table 5 depicts the results of the regression analysis with the above listed variables. Coefficient for Treasury 
variable is positive and significant at the 1% level providing strong evidence that the floating rate bonds are 
beneficial to the firm when issued in the high interest rate environment reinforcing our hypothesis. Coefficient 
of the Principal and Total Assets is negative and significant at the 5% level providing evidence that the small 
firms raising smaller amount of capital through the floating rate bonds benefit more, likely due to the floor on 
the coupon rate when it resets. Coefficient for Maturity is insignificant since the floating rate bonds are 
generally issued with short maturity. Coefficient for Ratings is negative at 10% level signifying within 
investment grade category, firms with lower rated issues stand to benefit more from the issue of these bonds.  
Coefficient for Split is negative at 5% level. This signifies that the firms with higher level of information 
asymmetry benefits less from issuing these securities since most of these bonds (90.13%) are issued at par 
therefore, the price is not likely to carry information content that mitigates information asymmetry between 
the firms and the investors. 
 
Coefficient for M/B is positive and highly significant at 1%. This provides strong evidence that high growth 
option firms stand to benefit significantly from the issuance of floating rate bonds. This observation 
confirms our second hypothesis that the firms in possession of growth options exhibit positive and 
significant CAR since, the floating rate bonds provide greater financial flexibility in addressing interest rate 
risk for the firms as compared to a more restrictive call option. 
 
 
* M/B = (Market value of Equity+ Book Value of Assets – Book Value of Equity)/Book Value of Assets. 
† FCF = (Operating cash flow – Tax – Int Exp – Cash dividend)/Net Sales 
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Coefficient for Leverage is positive and significant at 1% which suggests that issuing floating rate bonds 
provides greater financial flexibility to the firms especially, when the rates are high and expected to fall.  
 
Coefficient for FCF is insignificant signifying that the issuing these bonds has less potential managerial 
entrenchment implications. 
 


















We analyze 2,027 non-convertible, investment grade floating rate bonds (notes) issued between 1980 and 
2018. The motive for the study is to understand the possible role the floating rate provision plays in these 
bonds, and highlight firm characteristics firm possess that benefit the most from issuing these bonds. We find 
that majority (89.3%) of these issues are non-callable and a majority (81.6%) of them are issued during the 
high rate environment (1992 to 2007) where the rates are expected to fall in the future. We find that the 
floating rate provision is an effective alternative to the call option in mitigating the firm’s interest rate risk. 
Especially, since the call option can be restrictive and costly in terms of call protection period and call 
premium. In the case of floating rate bonds, the coupon resets to a lower rate periodically when the rates are 
falling unlike the call option which can make refinancing restrictive and costly. The market realizes this and 
rewards the issuing firm with a higher CAR in the event window surrounding the issue date. 
 
Using CAR as the dependent variable we further assess firm characteristics that are likely to benefit more 
from issuing these bonds. We find that the firms with growth options and with high leverage achieve a positive 
and significant CAR. This observation is likely due to the financial flexibility these firms achieve in, realizing 
growth options, through the issuance of these shorter maturity bonds as compared to the bonds with more 
restrictive covenants. Also, we find that firms with higher level of information asymmetry benefits less from 
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